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Abstract:  
We present a novel theory to explain the puzzling issue regarding why certain firms in 
financial distress, that must renegotiate their debt prefer a formal bankruptcy procedure, 
which is more costly, over direct negotiations with their debtholders. Specifically, we 
show that claimholders’ heterogeneous beliefs about the possible results of a formal 
plan – and about judicial discretion in particular – may lead to such a preference. In our 
model, informal processes are preferred when the total value of all corporate claims in a 
formal procedure, according to each claimholder’s beliefs, is less than the total value of 
the firm’s assets in an informal process. In such a case, all claimholders believe that 
they will be better off under an informal process because there is a positive surplus that 
can be divided among the parties (Pareto Improving). The proposed model can predict 
which resolution would be chosen under any set of claimholders’ beliefs about the 
different determinants driving the outcome of a formal procedure, such as the cost of 
bankruptcy, the likelihood of deviation from the absolute priority rule in a reorganization 
plan, and the probability of the court adopting a reorganization plan. An empirical 
analysis of 252 defaults in Moody’s annual reports during the 1996-2011 period supports 
the argument that heterogeneous beliefs ad creditor coordination problems are 
important drivers of the decision to restructure under formal bankruptcy procedures 
rather than through private workouts. 
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1 Introduction
A ﬁrm that must restructure its debt during ﬁnancial distress faces a choice between two al-
ternatives. It can privately renegotiate the debt claims in an informal process
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or ﬁle for for-
mal bankruptcy to resolve its creditor disputes through an in-court proceeding (‘litigation’).
Financial scholars suggest that it is in the best interest of debtholders and equityholders to
agree on an informal reorganization of the ﬁrm before deadweight costs are incurred (Hau-
gen and Senbet, 1978, 1988, Jensen, 1989, 1991, and Roe, 1987). Nevertheless, empirical
studies show that a substantial percentage of ﬁrms ﬁle for bankruptcy through formal pro-
cedures. Gilson, John and Lang (1990), Franks and Torous (1994), and Yost (2002) report
that the percentage of ﬁrms that complete a distressed exchange oﬀer (an informal process)
approximately equals the percentage of ﬁrms that ﬁle for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 —
the chapter of the U.S. bankruptcy code that governs corporate reorganization (a formal
procedure). In more recent studies including that of Jacobs et al. (2012) and ours, the
percentage of ﬁrms ﬁling for bankruptcy is higher than 70%.
In response to these empirical ﬁndings, the theoretical ﬁnancial literature explains the
preference for more costly formal bankruptcy procedures over informal processes by the
presence of at least one of the following frictions: asymmetric information, agency problems
and creditor conﬂicts. In this paper, we provide an additional possible explanation for this
puzzle. We show that the decision to choose a formal bankruptcy procedure may result from
the heterogeneous beliefs of diﬀerent claimholders with respect to the predicted outcomes
of such formal bankruptcy procedures.
As documented by Chang and Schoar (2007) and Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006), the
ﬁnal outcome of formal bankruptcy procedures is subject to judicial discretion.
2
Posner
1
Throughout this paper, we use the terms private workout, informal process, or out-of-court renegotiation
interchangeably.
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Chang and Schoar (2007) and Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006) empirically document that the percent-
ages paid out to creditors, the duration of Chapter 11 negotiations and violations of the absolute priority
rule (hereinafter APR) diﬀer signiﬁcantly among judges. This evidence is supported by Hotchkiss (1995),
who shows that cases ﬁled in the Southern District of New York have a somewhat higher probability of
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(2005) notes that judges may nonconsciously interpret the evidence — or even disregard
certain inconvenient truths — through the lens of their experiences. Moreover, under many
legislative systems the bankruptcy code itself may allow for judicial discretion, i.e., the
judge may have the right to force a resolution (even if previously rejected by a claimant)
and/or to stop negotiations altogether.
The eﬀect of judicial discretion on formal bankruptcy procedures can be channeled in
two ways to generate heterogeneous beliefs among diﬀerent claimholders. In the ﬁrst ap-
proach, one group of claimholders receives private signals, and these investors are thus
more informed than the second group of claimholders (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980, Hell-
wig, 1980, Wang, 1993, Shefrin and Statman, 1994, and Duﬃe and Lando, 2001). In the
second approach, diﬀerent claimholders “agree to disagree” about certain matters and do
not learn from one another’s behavior (Harris and Raviv, 1993, Zapatero, 1998, Veronesi,
1999, Basak, 2000, Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark, 2000, David, 2008, Duﬃe, Garleianu, and
Pedersen, 2002, Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal, 2009). Consistent with the second approach,
we consider a setting in which claimholders have diﬀerent estimates about the possible out-
comes of formal bankruptcy procedures because of their heterogeneous beliefs about the
importance of factors that aﬀect the payoﬀ under such procedures. Such factors include (i)
the probability of the court accepting a liquidation procedure (Chapter 7) versus a reorgani-
zation (Chapter 11), (ii) the additional cost of the formal bankruptcy process compared with
an informal process, and (iii) the extent to which the APR is violated upon reorganization
(i.e., the share that the equityholders will receive in a reorganization procedure).
We show that each claimholder decides whether to negotiate informally or formally by
calculating the value of her claim in a formal procedure — based on the factors presented
above — and being aware of the assessments that are made by other claimholders regarding
the values of their claims. We predict that informal processes are preferred only when the
total value of all claims in a formal bankruptcy procedure — as perceived by the holders of
such claims — is less than the total value of the ﬁrm assets in an informal process. Under such
subsequently entering a second bankruptcy or distressed restructuring.
4
a condition, claimholders may choose an informal process because all parties are better oﬀ
as a result of the positive surplus that can be divided according to their bargaining power.
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The condition presented requires that each claimholder perceives the informal restructuring
process as a Pareto Improving compared to formal bankruptcy procedures.
Whereas previous models demonstrate that asymmetric information, risk-shifting in-
centives, and creditor coordination problems may cause ineﬃciencies that can be mitigated
by legal and formal bankruptcy procedures, the formal procedure by itself may encourage
claimholders to prefer it over an informal process, even in the absence of such frictions.
Using our model, the conditions under which informal processes are preferable and agreed
upon by the diﬀerent claimholders under a Pareto Improving rule may be characterized
quantitatively.
The model shows how the claimholders’ heterogeneous beliefs about the probability of a
reorganization decision by the court, the added cost of formal bankruptcy over an informal
process, and the valuation of the APR under formal procedures determine which procedure is
chosen. Therefore, the model can identify the chosen solution, which is a necessary condition
for policymakers to understand the impact of bankruptcy rules and procedures on social
welfare. The testable predictions regarding a ﬁrm’s choice between in-court and out-of-court
procedures are the following. First, we ﬁnd that when claimholders have diﬀerent beliefs
only about the deviation from the APR, the probability of adopting an informal process
decreases as the deviation between bondholders and stockholders beliefs and the probability
of adopting a reorganization plan by the court decrease. Moreover, the probability of
adopting an informal process increases as the deadweight costs of liquidation increase and
as the costs of the formal procedure increase compared with an informal process.
Furthermore, if claimholders believe that the court can enforce the "fair and equitable"
rule (i.e., the share of the debtholder in a reorganization is at least as large as her share would
3
Analyzing the outcome of the restructuring process is beyond the scope of this paper. Fan and Sundare-
san (2000), François and Morellec (2004), and Broadie, Chernov, and Sundaresan, (2007) determine that
the outcome results from a cooperative game between debtholders and stockholders. Annabi, Breton, and
François (2012) show that a non-cooperative game is more appropriate to model Chapter 11 negotiations.
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have been had a liquidation procedure been adopted), the choice between a formal procedure
and an informal process is determined solely by their heterogeneous beliefs regarding the
probability of a reorganization procedure and the creditors’ likely share in such event.
Moreover, if the fair and equitable rule is imposed, the probability of an informal process
decreases for any set of parameters.
Second, we analyze the case in which claimholders have diﬀerent beliefs regarding only
the probability of the court accepting a reorganization procedure. In such case, a suﬃcient
but not necessary condition for an informal process is when creditors perceive a higher
probability of reorganization than stockholders. Moreover, we prove that if the fair and
equitable rule is imposed, then an informal process would always be preferred over the
formal procedure.
Third, we address the case in which claimholders have heterogeneous beliefs about the
amount of the deadweight costs in a formal bankruptcy. If claimholders have heterogeneous
beliefs only about the amount of such costs, we demonstrate that an informal process would
always be preferred. However, if claimholders have heterogeneous beliefs about whether the
court will accept a reorganization decision and the amount of bankruptcy costs, then the
choice of renegotiation procedure depends to a greater extent on the creditor’s belief rather
than on the stockholder’s belief.
We complement our analysis with an empirical investigation into the decision to resolve
ﬁnancial distress through formal bankruptcy or through a private workout. Our contri-
bution is twofold. First, prior empirical work on this topic is somewhat outdated (with
the exception of Jacobs et al., 2012, whose data sample ends in 2007, the previous studies
of Gilson, John and Lang, 1990; Chatterjee, Dhillon, and Ramirez, 1996; and Yost, 2002,
examine U.S. corporate defaults during the 1980’s and the 1990’s). Our study covering the
1996-2011 period provides updated evidence about decisions to resolve ﬁnancial distress.
Second, we examine the empirical determinants of such decisions in light of our arguments
about the heterogeneity in beliefs. The results provide support for the predictions stemming
from our arguments based on the heterogeneity in beliefs. They also conﬁrm that creditor
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coordination plays an important role in the decision to ﬁle for bankruptcy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature on
the choice between formal bankruptcy and private workout. In section 3, we discuss how
bankruptcy law aﬀects bargaining and present two examples that motivate the more general
analysis. In Section 4, we develop and calibrate the model that characterizes the diﬀerent
equilibriums. The empirical analysis is presented in Section 5. Concluding remarks are
found in Section 6.
2 The choice between private workout and formal bankruptcy
The approach presented belongs to the stream of ﬁnancial literature that is used to explain
the puzzling phenomena in which claimholders prefer a more costly formal bankruptcy
procedure to a private workout. The literature explains this puzzle by the presence of at
least one of the following frictions: asymmetric information, agency problems, and creditor
coordination.
The ﬁrst explanatory approach relates to contract theory and to the court’s screening
eﬀect that may minimize asymmetric information between bondholders and stockholders.
As argued by Giammarino (1989), Chen (2003), and Heinkel and Zechner (1993), a poor
equityholder has an incentive to disguise a ﬁrm’s true condition in a state of distress to avoid
liquidation or to obtain more favorable terms during a restructuring plan. If the court is
able to determine the true value of the ﬁrm’s assets, debtholders would be willing to pay
higher costs to mitigate this friction, which would lead them to prefer the formal procedure.
The second approach relates to agency problems. As noted by Jensen and Meckling
(1976), an equityholder in ﬁnancial distress may seek to expropriate wealth from creditors
by excessively increasing the risk of the ﬁrm’s operations. In a court-supervised process,
by contrast, additional disclosure rules, such as a detailed inventory and a valuation of all
assets, help mitigate the informational disadvantages of outsiders (Berkovitch and Israel,
1998).
A third approach arises from creditor conﬂicts when there are multiple creditors. If the
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restructuring of a debt involves multiple lenders, individual claimants have an incentive to
‘hold-out’ in the expectation that others will provide the concessions that ensure the success
of the restructuring. Because all claimants have similar incentives, however, the restructur-
ing is likely to fail (Roe, 1987, Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991). Typically, the coordination
problem is more severe in informal processes in which the adoption of a restructuring plan
requires unanimous consent among lenders, whereas in a formal bankruptcy process, the
problem is less severe because decisions about how to process the equityholder’s estate
require only a speciﬁed majority of the creditors in each class of claims. Jostarndt and
Sautner (2010) provide evidence for a sample of German ﬁrms that formal bankruptcy is
preferred when creditor coordination is poor.
4
3 Statement of the problem and motivating examples
In the classical ﬁnancial literature, in the event of default, equityholders surrender the ﬁrm
to the bond investors who make use of the remaining assets (Merton 1974, Black and Cox,
1976). However, in distress events, the ability of creditors to extract value through the time-
consuming bargaining process among claimholders may vary. The length and the results
of the process depend to a great extent on the nature of the formal procedure, which may
allow for bargaining among diﬀerent claimholders and judicial discretion.
The uncertainty that relates to the formal procedure can encourage diﬀerent claimhold-
ers to develop heterogeneous beliefs about the expected results of crucial elements of the
procedure. First, there is uncertainty with respect to the added cost of formal over informal
procedures, which may result from compensation for lawyers, accountants, consultants, and
expert witnesses. The ﬁnancial literature oﬀers mixed conclusions regarding the amount of
such costs. Whereas Altman (1984), Hotchkiss (1995), and Weiss and Wruck (1998), among
others, consider Chapter 11 costs to be high (approximately 8% of the pre-bankruptcy
4
In the U.S., a change in the interest rate, principal amount, or maturity of public debt outside formal
bankruptcy requires unanimity. Thus, although it may be public debtholders’ interest to agree to avoid
bankruptcy, it may be individually rational for bondholders to hold out.
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value of the ﬁrm’s assets), Alderson and Betker (1995), Gilson (1997), and Maksimovic and
Phillips (1998) consider such costs to be low (less than 2% of the pre-bankruptcy value of
the ﬁrm’s assets). The variation in costs may be explained by the variation in sample sizes
and sample periods. More recently, Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006) show that bankruptcy costs
are heterogeneous, ranging between 0% and 20%. Note also, that the level of uncertainty
with respect to the added cost of formal over informal procedures is augmented by the
uncertainty about the duration of the bankruptcy process.
5
To the extent that bankruptcy
costs increase with the time spent under bankruptcy, the uncertainty about the duration of
the bankruptcy process makes bankruptcy costs even harder to estimate.
A second issue relates to the choice between the reorganization and liquidation pro-
cedures. U.S. bankruptcy law discourages involuntary ﬁlings by leaving the choice of the
chapter ﬁling — liquidation under Chapter 7 or reorganization under Chapter 11 — to the
manager. However, if a plan is not approved by each impaired class, the court can unilater-
ally impose or “cram down” the plan on dissenting classes. Thus, the court has the ability
to convert a reorganization procedure into a liquidation procedure. At a liquidation event,
the ﬁrm’s assets are sold, and typically, there is no violation of the APR. Moreover, as
discovered by Stromberg (2000) and Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006), the payoﬀ to unsecured
debtholders and to stockholders is typically negligible.
The third source in which investors may have heterogeneous beliefs is the degree to which
the APR is violated through the reorganization. The APR implies that junior claims do not
receive any payment until senior claims are paid in full. A reorganization plan speciﬁes a
new capital structure for the ﬁrm, describing how creditors are paid in terms of cash or new
securities. Such plans, as shown empirically, frequently deviate from the APR. According
to Franks and Torous (1989), Eberhart, Moore and Roenfeldt (1990), and Weiss (1990),
the priority of claims is violated in three-quarters of Chapter 11 cases. In a more recent
5
For example, Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006) ﬁnd that the time spent by ﬁrms under Chapter 11 varies
from 2 to 74 months with an average of 27 months and a standard deviation of 13 months. Helwege (1999),
Denis and Rodgers (2007), and Kalay et al. (2007) also ﬁnd a substantial dispersion in the time spent in
bankruptcy.
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sample, Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006) ﬁnd deviation from the APR in only 12% of cases. As
with bankruptcy costs, the speciﬁc judge is an important factor and has explanatory power
in predicting such deviations.
Judicial discretion thus ampliﬁes the uncertainty surrounding the redistribution of reor-
ganized ﬁrm value across claimants. First, there is evidence of shareholder-favoring versus
creditor-favoring judges (Chang and Schoar, 2007). Second, shareholders can inﬂuence the
choice of bankruptcy venue — a practice referred to as forum shopping. Eisenberg and
LoPucki (1999) provide strong evidence for forum shopping in large bankruptcy reorgani-
zations. Parikh (2012) empirically conﬁrms that forum shopping remains a systemic issue
in bankruptcy.
After we review the potential causes for heterogeneous beliefs in a bankruptcy procedure
that our model covers, we then illustrate how these beliefs aﬀect claimholders’ decisions
among formal and informal processes by presenting two hypothetical examples. To simplify
matters, we consider a ﬁrm that has issued just one zero coupon debt instrument that is
supposed to be paid at the current time. The ﬁrm has assets with a value equal to 100, which
is less than the outstanding debt value; therefore, the ﬁrm is economically insolvent. Prior
to any action, however, the stockholder and the debtholder attempt to settle out of court to
avoid costs. During this bargaining process, we assume that each of the claimholders — the
stockholder and the debtholder — can make her own subjective estimation of the value of the
diﬀerent securities that were issued by the ﬁrm with full certainty. In addition, we assume
that the assessments that are made by each claimholder are transparent to one another.
In the ﬁrst example, the stockholder is certain that, if the case goes to formal bankruptcy,
the court would decide that the debtholder receives securities that are worth 60% of the
value of the ﬁrm’s assets in an informal process, the stockholders would receive 20%, and
the remaining 20% would be lost due to bankruptcy costs. The debtholder has diﬀerent
expectations upon formal bankruptcy. She is certain that she would receive 70% of the
ﬁrm’s assets in an informal process, whereas the present value of the bankruptcy costs is
25%, and the residual payoﬀ to the stockholder is equal to only 5%. If the valuations that
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are made are transparent to all claimholders, then at equilibrium, the dispute would be
solved informally out of court. The sum of the value of the equity, as estimated by the
equityholder (20%), and the value of the debt, as estimated by the debtholder (70%), under
the formal procedure is below the residual assets of the ﬁrm in an informal process (100%).
Therefore, both claimholders believe that they may be better oﬀ by negotiating out of court,
because there is a surplus of 10% that can be divided among the parties. In an informal
process, each side can oﬀer its counterpart a payoﬀ that is higher than the payoﬀ that the
counterpart expects to receive upon a formal bankruptcy procedure without diminishing
her own wealth and according to her belief (Pareto Improving).
In the second contradictory example, the shareholder has the same beliefs as in the ﬁrst
example; she is certain that if the case goes to formal bankruptcy the court would decide
that the debtholder would receive 60% of the ﬁrm’s assets, the stockholder would receive
20%, and the remaining 20% of the ﬁrm’s assets would be lost due to the expected value
of bankruptcy costs. However, in this example, the debtholder’s beliefs are changed; she
estimates that, under the formal procedure, her share is 90% of the residual assets, whereas
the present value of the bankruptcy costs is 5%, and the residual payoﬀ of the stockholder
is only 5%. If the valuations that were made are fully transparent to all claimholders, then
at equilibrium, the dispute would not be solved informally out of court. Under the formal
procedure, the sum of the equity value, as estimated by the stockholder (20%), and the
value of the debt, as estimated by the debtholder (90%), is higher than the residual assets
of the ﬁrm in an informal process (100%). Therefore, both sides believe that they can
achieve more by using a formal procedure, and they are aware that there is no place for
informal negotiations, because there is no surplus that can be divided.
In practice, the court in a formal bankruptcy procedure hears evidence about the ﬁrm’s
prospects in a valuation hearing and adopts a valuation based on its interpretation of the
often conﬂicting information. In an informal process, when the applicable bankruptcy court
is likely to exercise judicial discretion, equityholders and creditors must form opinions about
the outcome of the court not only by predicting the outcome using their own knowledge and
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understanding of the applicable fact patterns and their understanding of the facts available
to the other side, but also by trying to predict the behavior of the court according to
their knowledge and assessment capabilities. In the model set forth below and in contrast
to Giammarino (1989) and Chen (2004), we do not assume that the stockholder is better
informed about the likely outcome of a valuation hearing than the debtholder; instead,
we assume that both sides simply have contradictory beliefs about the results of a formal
bankruptcy procedure.
4 Heterogeneous beliefs about the formal bankruptcy proce-
dure
In this section we describe the valuation model that is used by claimholders in a formal
bankruptcy procedure. All claimholders are using an identical valuation model but may
have diﬀerent assessments of the parameters of such a model.
4.1 The basic model
We consider a ﬁrm in ﬁnancial distress ﬁnanced by equity and outstanding debt; the debt is
currently payable in full. Stockholders are assumed to act as a single class of claimholders;
creditors are also assumed to act as a single class.
6
Initially, stockholders claim that they
cannot pay the entire debt amount on time and that the ﬁrm is thus in default. We assume
that the value of the ﬁrm assets in an informal process is equal to V . If there is no agreement
between the two claimholders on an informal process, then a formal bankruptcy procedure
would take place. We assume the additional costs (compared with the costs that would be
incurred in a private workout) borne by the ﬁrm during formal bankruptcy are a fraction
α of the ﬁrm’s asset value.
6
As in Giammarino (1989), the manager can be understood as the owner-manager of the ﬁrm or as
the manager of a widely held ﬁrm who acts in the best interest of the ﬁrm’s shareholders. Similarly, the
debtholder can be understood as a single creditor or as an agent acting on behalf of all creditors.
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If a formal procedure has been chosen, there is a probability π of the ﬁrm entering into
structured bargaining, such as U.S. Chapter 11 reorganization, in which a continuation plan
is settled and the ﬁrm survives as a going concern, and a probability 1− π of a liquidation
decision, pursuant to which there would be a cash auction, such as Chapter 7 of the U.S.
bankruptcy code. If the court has decided on a reorganization procedure, there may be a
deviation from the APR, and therefore, the debtholders would receive only a portion β of
the remaining ﬁrm’s assets. Otherwise, the ﬁrm would be liquidated, and a fraction γ of
the remaining ﬁrm’s asset value would be lost.
All claimholders are risk neutral, and the risk-free rate of return is normalized to zero.
The basic model is extended to the case with risk-averse claimholders in the next subsection.
Pursuant to a formal bankruptcy procedure, the value of the shareholders’ claim (equity),
denoted by S, and the value of the creditors’s claim (debt), denoted by C, can be expressed
as:
S = πV (1− α) (1− β) ,
C = πV (1− α) β + (1− π)V (1− α) (1− γ) .
Creditors and stockholders may have heterogeneous beliefs about the important factors
that determine the value of the ﬁrm’s securities. These factors include the costs of formal
bankruptcy (α), the probability of a court decision on a reorganization decision (π), and the
portion of the ﬁrm’s assets that would be paid to the debtholders in a reorganization event
(β). Therefore, we use subscript s to denote the value of a security according to stockholders’
beliefs and the subscript c to denote the value of a security according to creditors’ beliefs.
The value of the stock and the debt according to each claimholder’s beliefs can be written,
respectively, as:
˜
S = π
s
V (1− α
s
) (1− β
s
) , (1)
˜
C = π
c
V (1− α
c
)β
c
+ (1− π
c
)V (1− α
c
) (1− γ) . (2)
During the ﬁrst stage of the bargaining, each of the claimholders estimates what would
be the value of the claims against the ﬁrm if a formal bankruptcy procedure were chosen.
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Because we assume that this initial assessment is known to each of the claimholders, then
an informal process would take place if and only if the sum of the value of each claim,
according to the beliefs of its holder, is less than the value of the ﬁrm’s assets in an informal
process.
Proposition 1 In a world in which claimholders have heterogeneous beliefs about the out-
come of a formal bankruptcy procedure and "agree to disagree" about their diﬀerence in
beliefs, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for an informal process to be chosen is
˜
S +
˜
C ≤ V, (3)
where
˜
S and
˜
C are given by equations (1) and (2), respectively.
Proof: If
˜
S+
˜
C ≤ V , then a private workout will be accepted by both parties as soon as
shareholders receive
˜
S, creditors receive
˜
C, and the positive surplus V −
(
˜
S +
˜
C
)
is shared
according to an agreed-upon plan between the claimholders. Conversely, if
˜
S+
˜
C > V , then
it will be impossible to privately negotiate a sharing rule of the assets’ value (V ) that leaves
both shareholders and creditors better oﬀ compared to what they might expect in formal
bankruptcy. 
In this model, claimholders with homogenous beliefs will opt for a private workout
because the formal bankruptcy entails additional costs (α) and potential liquidation costs
(γ) and therefore
S +C = V (1− α) [1− γ (1− π)] < V.
Expanding equation (3), private negotiations will take place if and only if the function
Ψ(α
s
, α
c
, β
s
, β
c
, π
s
, π
c
) : = π
s
(1− α
s
) (1− β
s
) + π
c
(1− α
c
)β
c
+(1− π
c
) (1− α
c
) (1− γ)− 1
is negative.
The study of functionΨ allows us to characterize how heterogeneity in beliefs determines
the type of renegotiation (private or formal). The next propositions provide the results of
this study.
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Proposition 2 APR enforcement. If the court can credibly enforce the APR, then β
s
=
β
c
= 1, and claimholders will always prefer to resolve ﬁnancial distress through a private
workout.
In this case, indeed, we obtain
Ψ(α
s
, α
c
, β
s
, β
c
, π
s
, π
c
) := (1− α
c
) [1− γ (1− π
c
)]− 1 < 0.
Proposition 2 oﬀers new insight into the issue of APR enforcement. Violations of APR
are commonly understood as an ex post ineﬃciency of formal bankruptcy; they are consid-
ered to be concessions that the court must give stockholders to reach an agreement for a
reorganization plan. In the "heterogeneous beliefs" argument, APR enforcement is neither
eﬃcient nor desirable. The possibility to deviate from the APR makes claimholders consider
formal bankruptcy to be potentially more valuable than a private workout.
Proposition 3 Heterogeneity in beliefs about the costs of formal bankruptcy. If
claimholders only disagree about the costs of formal bankruptcy (α
s
 = α
c
), then a private
workout will always be preferred.
Proposition 3 immediately follows from inequality Ψ(α
s
, α
c
, β, β, π, π) ≤ 0. Because
both claimholders consider formal bankruptcy to be more costly than a private workout,
then regardless of the degree to which they disagree about the magnitude of this extra cost,
they will both ﬁnd a private workout to be a more proﬁtable solution.
Proposition 4 Heterogeneity in beliefs about the fraction of ﬁrm value allocated
to creditors upon reorganization. If claimholders only disagree about the fraction of
ﬁrm value allocated to creditors upon reorganization (β
s
 = β
c
), then a private workout will
be preferred if and only if
β
c
− β
s
≤
α
π (1− α)
+
γ (1− π)
π
, (4)
where α and π denote the common beliefs about the additional costs of formal bankruptcy
and the probability of reorganization, respectively.
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Proposition 4 follows from condition Ψ(α,α, β
s
, β
c
, π, π) ≤ 0, which is equivalent to
claimholders preferring to renegotiate under a private workout. Proposition 4 states that
claimholders will utilize formal bankruptcy procedures when creditors are overly optimistic
about the share of the ﬁrm’s asset value that they can obtain from formal bankruptcy
(β
c
− β
s
suﬃciently positive). In this situation, indeed, creditors prefer to abandon private
negotiations because they expect to recover more from formal bankruptcy procedures. Note
that the condition associated with Proposition 4 does not involve the absolute belief of
creditors (β
c
) but a diﬀerence of opinions instead (β
c
− β
s
). It is therefore the degree
of heterogeneity in beliefs that actually determines the choice between private and formal
renegotiations.
Proposition 4 also demonstrates that the indiﬀerence threshold for the mode of ﬁnancial
distress resolution (i.e., the right-hand side of inequality (4)) increases with α and γ, but
it decreases with π. Consistent with intuition, this result indicates that the likelihood of a
private workout increases as formal bankruptcy becomes more expensive (high α or high γ),
all else being equal. Similarly, creditors’ relative optimism about β will be more important
when the probability of reorganization in formal bankruptcy (π) is higher.
In several jurisdictions (including the U.S.), for a reorganization plan to be conﬁrmed,
the court must rule that the reorganization being imposed is “fair and equitable”. This
rule essentially requires that the share of the debtholder be at least as large as her share
would have been under a liquidation procedure (Brown, 1989). When the court can credibly
enforce a fair and equitable plan, we have the following conditions
1 ≥ β
s
≥ 1− γ,
1 ≥ β
c
≥ 1− γ,
which entails that
−γ ≤ β
c
− β
s
≤ γ.
We therefore obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 5 Fair and equitable plan enforcement. Suppose that claimholders only
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disagree about the fraction of ﬁrm value allocated to creditors upon reorganization (β
s
 = β
c
),
and suppose that the court can credibly enforce a fair and equitable plan. If
γ >
α
π (1− α)
+
γ (1− π)
π
,
then the fair and equitable plan enforcement has no impact on claimholders’ preference for
a private workout. Otherwise, claimholders will always prefer to resolve ﬁnancial distress
through a private workout.
Essentially, fair and equitable plan enforcement reduces the scope for heterogeneity in
beliefs across claimholders and makes liquidation costs γ the new upper bound for the diﬀer-
ence in opinions about β. If this new constraint is binding, then beliefs are not suﬃciently
heterogeneous to make formal bankruptcy attractive to claimholders.
However, if claimholders have heterogeneous beliefs about the acceptance of a reorga-
nization decision and about the size of the deadweight cost of a formal procedure, then
the choice of renegotiation procedure depends to a greater extent on the creditor’s belief
rather than on the stockholder’s belief. This greater impact is illustrated by the following
example.
Suppose that the value of the ﬁrm’s assets in an informal process is 100. The creditor
believes that there is a 10% probability of the court accepting a reorganization plan if the
formal procedure is chosen, whereas the stockholder believes that there is a 50% chance of
the court accepting a reorganization plan. Both claimholders assume that the liquidation
costs are 30% of the ﬁrm’s assets and that the creditor’s share in a formal bankruptcy
procedure is equal to 20% of the ﬁrm’s residual assets. Table 1 presents the sum of the
values of the claims in a formal procedure as estimated by their holders.
Insert Table 1 here
This example shows that if the stockholder believes that there are no added costs for a formal
procedure, formal bankruptcy would be chosen, unless the creditor believes that these costs
exceed 7.5%. However, in the opposite case, when the creditor assumes zero added costs
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for a formal bankruptcy procedure, the informal process would be chosen, unless the added
costs estimated by the stockholders are greater than 12.5%.
Proposition 6 Heterogeneity in beliefs about the probability of reorganization. If
claimholders only disagree about the probability of reorganization (π
s
 = π
c
), then a private
workout will be preferred if and only if
π
s
− π
c
1− γ − β
(1− β)
≤
α
(1− α) (1− β)
+
γ
(1− β)
,
where β denotes the common belief about the share of ﬁrm value that is allocated to creditors
after reorganization.
Proposition 6 immediately follows from conditionΨ(α,α, β, β, π
s
, π
c
) ≤ 0, which ensures
that claimholders prefer to renegotiate under a private workout.
Consistent with intuition, Proposition 6 states that if creditors are relatively more pes-
simistic about the likelihood of reorganization (i.e., when π
c
is suﬃciently smaller than π
s
),
then a private workout will be the preferred mode of renegotiation.
Proposition 6 also shows that if formal bankruptcy does not entail extra costs (α = 0),
and if the court can enforce a fair and equitable plan (β ≥ 1− γ), then private workout will
always be preferred. Indeed, we would then have
Ψ(0, 0, β
s
, β
c
, π
s
, π
c
) = π
s
(1− β) + π
c
β + (1− π
c
) (1− γ)− 1
≤ π
s
(1− β) + β − 1 ≤ 0.
Naturally, the same result holds if formal bankruptcy entails additional costs (α > 0).
Proposition 6 therefore highlights that the existence of heterogeneous beliefs about the
likelihood of reorganization is not suﬃcient to shift equilibrium into formal bankruptcy if
the court can impose the fair and equitable rule. Thus, the knowledge about the court
and the strictness with which it enforces this rule has an essential impact on the chosen
renegotiation procedure.
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4.2 Risk-averse claimholders
We extend the previous framework to account for risk-averse claimholders. Speciﬁcally,
claimholders continue to have their own estimates of the extra costs of formal bankruptcy
(α) and creditor recovery upon reorganization (β), but now they evaluate their claims by
assigning a utility score that penalizes the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the
bankruptcy process.
7
In the approach involving heterogeneous beliefs, formal bankruptcy
appears to be a risky alternative to a private workout. Intuition therefore suggests that the
incentives for formal bankruptcy should thus be reduced by claimholders’ risk aversion. The
aim of this subsection is to gauge this disincentive economically within a simple framework
and a proper calibration exercise.
The utility function of economic agent x is denoted by U
x
(.). The line of reasoning that
led to Proposition 1 now entails that a necessary and suﬃcient condition for an informal
process to be chosen is
U
s
(
˜
S
)
+U
c
(
˜
D
)
≤ V.
Assuming quadratic utility functions, this conditions translates into
E
s
(
˜
S
)
−
λ
s
2
V ar
(
˜
S
)
+E
c
(
˜
D
)
−
λ
c
2
V ar
(
˜
D
)
≤ V,
where λ
x
denotes the risk aversion coeﬃcient for agent x. Expanding and simplifying
expectations and variances, we obtain the following necessary and suﬃcient condition for a
private workout to be preferred over formal bankruptcy:
V ≥ π
s
V (1− α
s
) (1− β
s
)
(
1−
λ
s
2
(1− π
s
)V (1− α
s
) (1− β
s
)
)
+π
c
V (1− α
c
) β
c
+ (1− π
c
)V (1− α
c
) (1− γ)
−
λ
c
2
π
c
(1− π
c
)V
2
(1− α
c
)
2
(β
c
− (1− γ))
2
.
At this point, we can measure the impact of risk aversion on the resolution of ﬁnancial
distress. To this end, we calibrate the values of the parameters of common beliefs by using
7
A further extension, beyond the scope of this paper, would be to consider that beliefs about additional
costs of formal bankruptcy (α) and creditor recovery upon reorganization (β) are also stochastic.
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estimates from empirical observation. Table 2 presents the median values for α, β, γ and
π, as reported by recent empirical studies on Chapter 11 outcomes.
Insert Table 2 here
For purposes of calibration, we assume that the ﬁrm incurs identical indirect costs of
ﬁnancial distress (e.g., loss of investment opportunities) if renegotiations are undertaken in a
private workout or under formal bankruptcy. Consequently, the additional costs stemming
from formal bankruptcy amount to the direct costs of the formal bankruptcy procedure
(such as compensation provided to lawyers, accountants, consultants and expert witnesses).
Moreover, Table 1 shows the levels at which we set the extra costs of formal negotiations
(α = 5%), the fraction of ﬁrm value allocated to creditors upon reorganization (β = 80%),
the proportional liquidation costs (γ = 5%), and the probability of reorganization (π =
80%).
Under this set of calibrated values and with no risk aversion (λ
s
= λ
c
= 0), Propositions
4 and 6 can be explicitly characterized as follows, with private workout being preferred if
one of these conditions is satisﬁed:
β
c
− β
s
≤ 0.07829,
π
s
− 0.75π
c
≤ 0.51316.
These two conditions are illustrated in Figure 1 (straight lines), which shows the do-
mains for a private workout and formal bankruptcy as a function of claimholders’ beliefs.
As Figure 1 shows, one of the following conditions must be met for formal bankruptcy to
be preferred: (i) creditors are more optimistic about the value that they can recover upon
reorganization (β
c
is above the value shared in the common belief) or (ii) shareholders are
substantially more optimistic about the probability of reorganization (π
s
is signiﬁcantly
above the value shared in the common belief). As posited by Propositions 4 and 6, ho-
mogeneity in beliefs favors the resolution of ﬁnancial distress through a private workout.
Conversely, a certain amount of disagreement among claimholders is required for them to
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opt for a formal bankruptcy procedure in the hope that the third party (i.e., the court) will
resolve the ﬁnancial distress according to their beliefs.
When introducing risk aversion in Figure 1 (dashed lines), we observe that the domain for
formal bankruptcy shrinks as claimholders become more risk averse. This result conﬁrms
the intuition from the heterogeneous beliefs argument, i.e., formal bankruptcy is a risky
alternative to private negotiations. Because of the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of
formal bankruptcy and its payoﬀs, risk-averse claimholders will be more prone to resolve
ﬁnancial distress through a private workout.
5 Empirical analysis
The goal of this section is to examine the empirical determinants of the decision to resolve
ﬁnancial distress through formal bankruptcy or through a private restructuring. Following
this examination, we will discuss the extent to which these determinants are consistent with
the rationale of heterogeneity in beliefs. Admittedly, the scope for disagreement between
shareholders and creditors is hardly observable. We therefore use proxies to designate
situations in which claimholders’ beliefs are heterogeneous.
5.1 Data
The initial sample consists of all defaults (excluding technical defaults such as missed pay-
ments) recorded in Moody’s annual reports from 1996 to 2011.
8
After matching with avail-
able ﬁnancial data is performed, we are left with 344 reported defaults that are classiﬁed as
either formal bankruptcy (labeled "Chapter 11", "bankruptcy", or "prepack" in Moody’s
reports) or private restructurings (labeled "distressed exchange" in Moody’s reports). After
removing ﬁrms with missing values in their ﬁnancials, the ﬁnal sample consists of 252 de-
8
By working with Moody’s reported defaults, we are focusing on ﬁrms that have both bank debt and
outstanding bonds. For ﬁrms such as these with multiple classes of debt, the choice between formal and
informal restructuring is particularly relevant.
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faults that further breaks down into 180 bankruptcy ﬁlings and 72 private restructurings.
9
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the ﬁnal sample.
Insert Table 3 here
Table 3 highlights several industry eﬀects on the resolution of ﬁnancial distress. Firms
belonging to the primary sector, in addition to transportation and communications ﬁrms,
are more prone to restructure privately. All other industries show a mild overrepresentation
in bankruptcy ﬁlings.
The dependent variable is a dummy taking the value of one (zero) when the defaulting
ﬁrm ﬁles for bankruptcy (undergoes a private restructuring).
10
The dependent variable is
referred to as the bankruptcy dummy.
The previous empirical studies from Gilson, John, and Lang (1990), Chatterjee, Dhillon,
and Ramirez (1996), Yost (2002), and Jacobs, Karagozoglu, and Layish (2012) identify
several key determinants in the decision to opt for formal bankruptcy, including asset tan-
gibility, leverage, growth opportunities, operating performance, debt placement, and the
number of debt issues. We therefore include the determinants described below in our re-
gression analysis.
The ﬁnancial statement data are from Compustat (for North American ﬁrms) and
Worldscope (for all others) and are collected for the latest available year before default.
Other ﬁrm-level data (creditor structure, number of subsidiaries) are from Orbis and Mer-
gent Webreports.
Asset tangibility All else being equal, ﬁrms with intangible assets are more diﬃcult
for outsiders to evaluate. According to the asymmetric information argument, the higher
9
For comparison, the sample size of the previous empirical studies by Gilson, John, and Lang (1990),
Chatterjee, Dhillon, and Ramirez (1996), and Yost (2002) are 169, 202, and 174 defaults, respectively.
Jacobs, Karagozoglu and Layish (2012) examine bankruptcy ﬁlings and outcomes for a sample of 518 ﬁrms
during the 1985-2007 period.
10
As a robustness check, we constructed a similar dummy variable on the sample that excludes prepacks
(20 observations); the results (not reported) are qualitatively unchanged.
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the ratio of intangible assets is, the stronger the incentive to ﬁle for bankruptcy is. We
proxy asset tangibility as the ratio of intangible assets over total assets.
Firm leverage All else being equal, a ﬁrm with high leverage is more prone to agency
conﬂicts between shareholders and creditors. The agency argument therefore predicts a
positive relationship between leverage and preference for formal bankruptcy. Conversely, as
noted by Jensen (1989), a higher debt level provides claimholders with a greater incentive
to renegotiate, which is consistent with the heterogeneous beliefs argument — the more the
ﬁrm is leveraged, the more certain claimholders are that formal bankruptcy will be costly.
Thus, more debt entails less disagreement and a preference for a private restructuring. We
use the ratio of long-term debt over total assets as our proxy for this determinant.
Growth opportunities The presence of growth opportunities (proxied by the market-
to-book ratio) can lead to misalignment between shareholder and creditor interests. The
agency argument therefore predicts a positive relationship with the bankruptcy dummy;
the heterogeneous beliefs argument also predicts the same positive relationship because
claimholders will be more likely to disagree about how the court will evaluate these op-
portunities. We proxy growth opportunities as the diﬀerence between the market value of
equity and the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity.
Operating performance A defaulting ﬁrm with poor operating performance will
likely require extensive restructuring, and agency conﬂicts between shareholders and credi-
tors will be more severe. Moreover, as argued by Yost (2002), the debtor-in-possession rule
that is applied in the formal bankruptcy process provides a tool for claimholders to receive
additional ﬁnancing and alleviate agency conﬂicts. The agency argument therefore predicts
a negative relationship between operating performance and the bankruptcy dummy. We
argue that ﬁrm operating performance is another source of heterogeneity in beliefs. Firms
with good operating performance are likely to be reorganized and therefore leave little room
for doubt about the outcome of formal bankruptcy. By contrast, shareholders and creditors
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are more inclined to disagree about judicial decision making when operating performance
is poor. We use return on assets as a proxy for ﬁrm operating performance.
Debt placement and multiple creditors We use the amount of defaulted-upon
bonds (reported by Moody’s) divided by long-term debt — which reﬂects the fraction of
public debt in the debt structure — as one variable, and we use the number of private
debt issues as another; these two variables serve as proxies for the diﬃculty in coordination
among creditors. A positive relationship between these variables and the dependent variable
is therefore predicted.
Asset liquidity During the resolution of ﬁnancial distress, claimholders must bargain
over the disposal of short-term assets. The more illiquid these assets are, the more disagree-
ment about their liquidation value will result. Thus, according to the heterogeneous beliefs
argument, asset liquidity should be negatively linked to the bankruptcy dummy. We use
the current ratio as a proxy for asset liquidity.
Creditor protection From Propositions 4 and 6, we argue that a ﬁrm is more likely
to ﬁle for bankruptcy when creditors are optimistic about its recovery. Creditors will expect
a higher recovery rate when their debt is secured. However, the recovery on secured debt is
subject to judicial discretion. Bankruptcy judges have some latitude to more or less enforce
the liquidation of the applicable collateral to pay back secured creditors. A classic example
is the practice of "asset stripping" in Chapter 11 cases in which bankruptcy judges reinvest
the collateral to overprotect ﬁrm assets from a run by creditors (see Weiss and Wruck, 1998,
for evidence). The heterogeneous beliefs argument therefore predicts a positive relationship
between the proportion of secured debt and the bankruptcy dummy. Thus, we proxy creditor
protection with the fraction of secured debt over long-term debt.
Forum shopping Propositions 4 and 6 also predict that a ﬁrm is more likely to ﬁle
for bankruptcy when shareholders are optimistic about the probability of reorganization.
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The reorganization decision is made at the bankruptcy judge’s discretion. In particular,
Gennaioli and Rossi (2011) show that the intensity of judicial discretion depends on share-
holders’ ability to forum shop (i.e., to choose the bankruptcy venue). Bris et al. (2006)
empirically document that the bankruptcy venue has an impact on the probability of re-
organization and on creditor recovery. We use the number of the ﬁrm’s subsidiaries as an
indication of shareholders’ ability to forum shop. Thus, the heterogeneous beliefs argument
predicts a positive relationship between this variable and the bankruptcy dummy.
Table 4 summarizes the variables that are used in the empirical study and their predicted
relationships with the likelihood of ﬁling for bankruptcy.
Insert Table 4 here
The set of variables includes six determinants that capture the eﬀects of informational
asymmetry, agency, and creditor coordination. Among these, three variables (leverage,
growth opportunities, and operating performance) also account for the impact of heteroge-
neous beliefs, two of which (growth opportunities and operating performance) have similar
sign predictions. In other words, these two variables will not allow us to discriminate be-
tween the heterogeneous beliefs eﬀect and the eﬀects predicted by other rationales. Notably
however, the other third variable (leverage) is predicted to behave in the opposite direction
depending on whether the heterogeneous beliefs argument or other rationales hold. Inspec-
tion of the estimated coeﬃcient for this variable will therefore be particularly informative of
the relative importance of the heterogeneous beliefs argument compared to other rationales.
Finally, the set of variables includes three other determinants that speciﬁcally capture the
eﬀects of heterogeneous beliefs (asset liquidity, creditor protection, and forum shopping).
The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 5. On average, our sample ﬁrms are
highly leveraged, have poor operating performance, and have assets that are relatively
liquid and tangible. There are important discrepancies insofar as growth opportunities are
concerned. Creditor coordination looks to be a signiﬁcant issue because private debt is
prominent in liabilities and there are multiple creditors. Most creditors are unsecured, and
the large number of subsidiaries might indicate real possibilities for forum shopping.
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Insert Table 5 here
5.2 Results
5.2.1 Logit regressions
Table 6 presents the results of the logit regressions.
11
We present ﬁve diﬀerent speciﬁcations
that each account for time-ﬁxed eﬀects and robust standard errors. In unreported results,
we also control for ﬁrm size (log of assets) and industry (ﬁrst digit of SIC code), and
we arrive at similar ﬁndings. Model (1) includes the three variables whose eﬀects can
be exclusively attributed to other rationales (asymmetric information, agency eﬀects, and
creditor coordination). Model (2) adds to model (1) the three variables whose eﬀects are
jointly explained by heterogeneous beliefs and other rationales. Model (3) includes the three
variables whose eﬀects can be exclusively attributed to heterogeneous beliefs. Model (4)
adds to model (3) the three variables whose eﬀects are jointly explained by heterogeneous
beliefs and other rationales. Model (5) includes all the variables.
Insert Table 6 here
The model with all the variables (model (5)) achieves a relatively good ﬁt with the
data and demonstrates a prediction rate of about 83%. All six predictions emanating
from the heterogeneous beliefs argument are supported by this regression speciﬁcation.
The likelihood of ﬁling for bankruptcy is negatively related to asset liquidity, operating
performance, and leverage, and positively related to growth opportunities (a result that
contrasts that of Gilson, John, and Lang, 1990), creditor protection, and forum shopping.
Additionally, the negative relationship with leverage is at odds with the agency argument.
The predictions from the heterogeneous beliefs argument lose statistical signiﬁcance
when the argument is taken as a stand-alone rationale. In models (3) and (4), the eﬀects of
11
Jacobs, Karazoglu, and Layish (2012) show that the logit model performs better than local regression
models or neural network approaches with respect to predicting bankruptcy ﬁlings.
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asset liquidity, creditor protection, and forum shopping cannot be captured at the 10% sig-
niﬁcance level. Nonetheless, the eﬀects that are jointly explained by heterogeneous beliefs
and other rationales remain signiﬁcant with the sign correctly predicted by the heteroge-
neous beliefs argument.
As in prior empirical studies, the proxies for creditor coordination ("debt placement"
and "multiple creditors") are found to play a signiﬁcant role in the decision to ﬁle for
bankruptcy. We see in models (1) and (2) that the creditor coordination argument explains
(for the most part) the decision to ﬁle for bankruptcy, whereas the informational asymmetry
and agency arguments seem to play a minor role in this decision.
5.2.2 Model comparisons
Table 6 also reports metrics for the goodness of ﬁt of the diﬀerent model speciﬁcations,
namely, the pseudo R
2
, the prediction rate, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and the
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). All these metrics convey similar indications regarding
the classiﬁcation of model speciﬁcations and the quality of their ﬁt to the data. Model (1)
— which essentially captures the eﬀects of creditor coordination — has greater explanatory
power than models (3) or (4), which exclusively capture the eﬀects of heterogeneous beliefs.
The inclusion of agency eﬀects (in models (2) and (4)) hardly improves the speciﬁcation.
Finally, the eﬀects of heterogeneous beliefs provide incremental explanatory power when
combined with the eﬀects of creditor coordination (model (5)).
We formally test for the quality of the model ﬁt by using the Likelihood Ratio tests
(LR tests), which allow for a comparison between embedded speciﬁcations; these results are
reported in Table 7.
Insert Table 7 here
The LR tests provide statistical conﬁrmation of our initial assessment of the speciﬁca-
tions. Although creditor coordination as a stand-alone argument appears to be an important
determinant of the decision to ﬁle for bankruptcy, the inclusion of the eﬀects of heteroge-
neous beliefs enhances the model speciﬁcation. Heterogeneity in beliefs should therefore be
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considered a relevant additional rationale that explains the choice between private restruc-
turing and formal bankruptcy.
6 Conclusion
A ﬁrm that must restructure its debt during ﬁnancial distress faces a choice between two
alternatives: privately renegotiate debt claims against it in an informal process (i.e., through
an out-of-court workout) or ﬁle for bankruptcy to resolve creditor disputes through in-
court proceedings. Financial scholars suggest that it is in the best interests of claimholders
to agree on an informal reorganization of the ﬁrm before incurring any deadweight costs.
Nevertheless, empirical studies indicate that a substantial percentage of ﬁrms choose formal
bankruptcy. The puzzle is explained in the ﬁnancial literature by the presence of at least one
of the following factors: asymmetric information, agency problems and creditors conﬂicts.
In this paper, we provide an additional explanation for this puzzle. We show that the
decision to choose formal bankruptcy procedures may be due to the heterogeneous beliefs of
the diﬀerent claimholders regarding the results of formal bankruptcy procedures. We show
that each claimholder decides whether to negotiate informally or formally by estimating the
value of her claim in a formal procedure and being aware of the assessments made by the
other claimholders for the value of their claims. An informal process is chosen only if the
total value of all claims (as perceived by its holders) in a formal bankruptcy procedure is less
than the total value of the ﬁrm assets in an informal process. In such a case, claimholders
believe that they will be better oﬀ because of the positive surplus that can be divided
according to their bargaining power.
This paper analyzes how diﬀerent claimholder beliefs about the diﬀerent determinants
driving the outcome of a formal procedure (including the added costs of bankruptcy, the
deviation from the APR in a reorganization plan, and the probability of the court accepting
a reorganization plan) aﬀect the claimholders’ choice between the diﬀerent types of debt
resolution.
Finally, we provide empirical evidence supporting heterogeneity in beliefs as an impor-
28
tant determinant of the decision to ﬁle for bankruptcy. Our ﬁndings also conﬁrm that
creditor coordination is another key driver in such decisions.
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Tables
α
s
0 2.5 5 7.5 10 12.5 15 17.5 20
α
c
0 105.0 104.0 103.0 102.0 101.0 100.0 99.0 98.0 97.0
2.5 103.4 102.4 101.4 100.4 99.4 98.4 97.4 96.4 95.4
5 101.8 100.8 99.8 98.8 97.8 96.8 95.8 94.8 93.8
7.5 100.1 99.1 98.1 97.1 96.1 95.1 94.1 93.1 92.1
10 98.5 97.5 96.5 95.5 94.5 93.5 92.5 91.5 90.5
12.5 96.9 95.9 94.9 93.9 92.9 91.9 90.9 89.9 88.9
15 95.3 94.3 93.3 92.3 91.3 90.3 89.3 88.3 87.3
17.5 93.6 92.6 91.6 90.6 89.6 88.6 87.6 86.6 85.6
20 92.0 91.0 90.0 89.0 88.0 87.0 86.0 85.0 84.0
Table 1: Total value of ﬁrm claims in a formal bankruptcy procedure as perceived by its
claimholders with heterogeneous beliefs about the costs of formal bankruptcy.
Parameter α
s
(resp. α
c
) denotes the added cost (in %) of formal bankruptcy according
to the stockholder’s (resp. creditor’s) belief. The value of ﬁrm’s assets in an informal process
is normalized to 100. The bondholder believes that there is a 10% probability that the court
will accept a reorganization plan if a formal procedure is chosen, and the stockholder believes
that this probability is 50%. Both claimholders assume the liquidation costs are 30% of the
ﬁrm’s assets and that the payoﬀ to the bondholder in formal bankruptcy would be equal
to 20% of the ﬁrm’s residual assets in an informal process. A formal procedure would be
chosen whenever the value of assets in a formal procedure is greater than 100.
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Sample Sample Average
Authors size period value
Panel A: Liquidation rate (1− π)
Denis and Rodgers (2007) 224 1985—1994 18%
Kalay, Singhal and Tashjian (2007) 459 1991—1998 20%
Bris, Welch and Zhu (2006) 312 1995—2001 24%
Carapeto (2005) 389 1986—1997 14%
Jacobs, Karagozoglu and Layish (2012) 421 1985—2007 17%
Hotchkiss and Mooradian (2004) 1,770 1979—2002 21%
Panel B: Direct costs of ﬁnancial distress under Chapter 11 (α)
Bris, Welch and Zhu (2006) 225 1995—2001 9.5%
LoPucki and Doherty (2004) 48 1998—2002 1.4%
Betker (1997) 75 1986—1993 3.9%
Weiss (1990) 37 1979—1986 3.1%
Panel C: Liquidation costs (γ)
Bris, Welch and Zhu (2006) 61 1995—2001 8.1%
Lawless and Ferris (1997) 98 1991—1995 6.1%
Ang, Chua and McConnell (1982) 86 1963—1979 7.5%
Panel C: Absolute Priority Rule violations (β)
Bharath, Panchapagesan and Werner (2010) 531 1991—2005 22%
Bris, Welch and Zhu (2006) 312 1995—2001 12%
Table 2: Empirical estimates of Chapter 11 parameters.
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All defaults Restructuring Bankruptcy
Industry SIC code # % # % # %
Agricultural, mining, construction 1-19 28 11.1 16 22.2 12 6.7
Manufacturing 20-39 91 36.1 20 27.8 71 39.4
Transport, communications 40-49 59 23.4 24 33.4 35 19.4
Wholesale, retail 50-59 30 11.9 2 2.8 28 15.6
Financial 60-69 19 7.5 5 6.9 14 7.8
Services 70-89 25 10.0 5 6.9 20 11.1
Total 252 100 72 100 180 100
Year Restructurings Bankruptcies Total Year Restructurings Bankruptcies Total
1996 0 4 4 2004 2 11 13
1997 0 8 8 2005 0 8 8
1998 2 10 12 2006 1 5 6
1999 6 15 21 2007 0 3 3
2000 1 12 13 2008 7 12 19
2001 4 27 31 2009 29 28 57
2002 11 13 24 2010 4 4 8
2003 2 14 16 2011 4 5 9
Table 3: Industry classiﬁcation and year count of sample defaults.
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Variable Proxy Source Sign
Intangible assets Intangible assets over total assets Compustat / Worldscope (+)
Leverage Long term debt over total assets Compustat / Worldscope (+) [-]
Growth opportunities Market-to-book ratio Compustat / Datastream (+) [+]
Operating performance Return on assets Compustat / Worldscope (-) [-]
Debt placement Amount defaulted on bonds Moody’s / Compustat (+)
over long term debt
Multiple creditors Number of Orbis / Mergent (+)
private debt issues
Asset liquidity Current ratio Compustat / Worldscope [-]
Creditor protection Secured debt Compustat / Worldscope [+]
over long term debt
Forum shopping Number of subsidiaries Mergent [+]
Table 4: Variables used in the empirical study.
The column "Sign" refers to the predicted sign of the relationship between the variable
and the probability of ﬁling for bankruptcy. The signs of relationships speciﬁcally predicted
by the heterogeneous beliefs argument are indicated with square brackets. Sign predictions
from other rationales are indicated with round brackets.
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Variable Mean Median Std dev Min Max
Bankruptcy dummy 0.710 1 0.455 0 1
Intangible assets 0.151 0.070 0.185 0 0.807
Asset liquidity 1.423 1.140 1.416 0 12.630
Leverage 0.699 0.623 0.491 0.010 5.487
Growth opportunities 10.076 0.529 69.669 −163.771 770.415
Operating performance −0.044 0.005 0.176 −1.252 0.690
Debt placement 0.600 0.588 0.470 0.000 5.122
Multiple creditors 1.734 1 1.813 0 13
Creditor protection 0.347 0.313 0.293 0 0.994
Forum shopping 56.115 16 179.012 0 2529
Table 5: Descriptive statistics.
Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics for the bankruptcy dummy (equal to one when
the defaulting ﬁrm ﬁles for bankruptcy) and for ﬁnancial characteristics of defaulting ﬁrms.
The sample consists of 252 defaults (180 bankruptcy ﬁlings and 72 private restructurings)
recorded in Moody’s annual reports from 1996 to 2011. The ﬁnancial statement data are
from Compustat (for North American ﬁrms) and Worldscope (for all others) and are col-
lected on the latest available year before default. Other ﬁrm-level data (creditor structure,
number of subsidiaries) are from Orbis and Mergent Webreports.
40
Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant −1.721
∗
(0.885)
−1.329
(0.941)
0.269
∗
(0.775)
0.428
(0.847)
−1.317
(1.003)
Intangible assets (+) −0.269
(0.837)
−0.422
(0.894)
−1.092
(0.940)
Leverage (+) [-] −1.105
∗∗
(0.530)
−0.939
∗
(0.506)
−1.505
∗∗∗
(0.574)
Growth opportunities (+) [+] 0.016
∗∗
(0.008)
0.018
∗∗
(0.009)
0.020
∗∗
(0.009)
Operating performance (-) [-] −1.920
(1.265)
−2.809
∗∗
(1.297)
−2.357
∗
(1.413)
Debt placement (+) 2.416
∗∗∗
(0.503)
2.452
∗∗∗
(0.519)
3.006
∗∗∗
(0.566)
Multiple creditors (+) 0.343
∗∗∗
(0.142)
0.384
∗∗∗
(0.159)
0.318
∗∗
(0.165)
Asset liquidity [-] −0.128
(0.125)
−0.143
(0.110)
−0.313
∗∗
(0.128)
Creditor protection [+] 0.345
(0.511)
0.705
(0.539)
1.170
∗
(0.682)
Forum shopping [+] 0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
0.003
∗
(0.002)
Pseudo R
2
(%) 25.66 28.74 16.36 20.29 31.60
Pseudo log likelihood −112.75 −108.09 −126.86 −120.90 −103.75
AIC 263.50 260.18 291.71 285.80 257.49
BIC 330.56 337.82 358.77 363.45 345.73
Prediction rate (%) 82.14 82.54 73.81 73.02 82.94
Table 6: Logit regression results.
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one when the defaulting ﬁrm ﬁles for
bankruptcy. The column "Sign" refers to the predicted sign of the relationship between the
variable and the probability of ﬁling for bankruptcy. The signs of relationships speciﬁcally
predicted by the heterogeneous beliefs argument are indicated with square brackets. Sign
predictions from other rationales are indicated with round brackets. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses. The prediction rate is the percentage of observations correctly classiﬁed
by the model. Superscripts
∗∗∗
,
∗∗
, and
∗
indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
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Model Statistic p-value DF
LR test with respect to model (5)
Model (1) 18.01 0.0062 6
Model (2) 8.68 0.0338 3
Model (3) 46.22 0 6
Model (4) 34.31 0 3
LR test with respect to model (4)
Model (3) 11.91 0.0077 3
LR test with respect to model (2)
Model (1) 9.33 0.0252 3
Table 7: Likelihood Ratio tests.
Table 7 reports the Likelihood Ratio tests comparing diﬀerent embedded model speciﬁca-
tions. Model (1) includes the three variables with eﬀects that can be exclusively attributed
to other rationales (asymmetric information, agency eﬀects, and creditor coordination).
Model (2) adds to model (1) the three variables whose eﬀects are jointly explained by het-
erogeneous beliefs and other rationales. Model (3) includes the three variables whose eﬀects
can be exclusively attributed to heterogeneous beliefs. Model (4) adds to model (3) the
three variables whose eﬀects are jointly explained by heterogeneous beliefs and other ratio-
nales. Model (5) includes all the variables. The table reports the test statistics and the
corresponding p-value and degrees of freedom (DF).
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Figure 1: Domains for private workout and formal bankruptcy.
The ﬁgures show the domains for formal bankruptcy and private workout when claimhold-
ers beliefs are heterogeneous. In the left graph, shareholders and creditors have their own
subjective beliefs β
s
and β
c
about the fraction of the ﬁrm’s assets that will be paid to
the creditors in a reorganization. In the right graph, shareholders and creditors have their
own subjective beliefs π
s
and π
c
about the probability of reorganization. Common belief
parameters include the following: the extra costs of formal negotiations (α = 5%), the frac-
tion of ﬁrm value allocated to creditors upon reorganization (β = 80%), the proportional
liquidation costs (γ = 5%), and the probability of reorganization (π = 80%). The straight
line represents the case for risk-neutral claimholders (λ
s
= λ
c
= 0). The short dashed line
represents the case for moderately risk-averse claimholders (λ
s
= λ
c
= 2). The long dashed
line represents the case for highly risk-averse claimholders (λ
s
= λ
c
= 5).
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